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I. Introduction
The Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA) was enacted in 1980 to give the
government and private individuals the power to hold those who
release hazardous substances liable for the cost of the clean-up.1
There are two prerequisites for holding a party liable under
CERCLA. The first relates to the site and the substance. Under
section 107(a), a party can only be held liable if (1) the substance
is "hazardous;" (2) there is a "release" or "threat of release;" and
(3) that release or threat of release comes from a "facility. "2
The broad interpretations of the definitions of these terms has
allowed almost all hazardous substance clean-up actions to be
brought under CERCLA. In fact, very few substances are exempt
from the label "hazardous" and almost all sites, buildings and
vessels would qualify as "facilities" for the purpose of liability
under CERCLA.3
The second prerequisite to liability involves the party. There
1 United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 576
(D.Md. 1986); H.R.Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1(1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119.
2 42 U.S.C. §9607(a) (1994 & Supp. 1995).
3 ALLAN J. TOPOL & REBECCA SNOW, Superfund Law & Procedure §5.8
458, 469-70 (1992); 42 U.S.C. §§9601, 9602 (1994 & Supp. 1995). The
CERCLA definition of "hazardous" incorporates substances designated as
hazardous waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),
toxic pollutants under the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, hazardous
substances under the Toxic Substance Control Act, and any substance designated
as hazardous under CERCLA section 102. For the purpose of liability under
CERCLA, a facility is "(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe
., well .... impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle,.
or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited...
or otherwise come[s] to be located; but does not include any consumer product
in consumer use. "
CERCLA
are four classes of potentially liable parties (PRP's) under
CERCLA: (1) Past owners or operators; (2) parties who arranged
for disposal of the substance; (3) transporters who, after selecting
the disposal site, carried the hazardous substance from the generator
to the disposal site; and (4) current owners or operators.4
"Owner/operator" is defined in section 101(20)(A) of
CERCLA. Included in the definition is an exemption for those who
hold an indicia of ownership primarily to protect a secured interest.5
Some commentators have noted, however, that the exact nature of
this exemption is unclear.6 In 1994, the D.C. Circuit vacated an
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Final Rule that had
attempted to define and clarify exactly what actions will lead to
lender liability for hazardous substance contamination.7 As a result
of the court's decision, there has been considerable confusion and
uncertainty in commercial lending institutions about what actions
may be taken without losing the secured lender exemption.
This paper will examine the options available for secured
lenders faced with potential liability under CERCLA. Part I will be
a general analysis of the purpose of CERCLA. A discussion of the
sections of the act which have been held to provide for the liability
of secured creditors will be included. Part II will provide a
chronological history of the courts treatment of lender liability
4 42 U.S.C. §9607(a) (1994 & Supp. 1995).
5 42 U.S.C. §9601(20)(A) (1994 & Supp. 1995).
6 See, e.g. John W. Ames et al., Toxins-Are-Us: Charting the Waters of an
Unsafe Harbor, 1994 A.B.I. JNL. LEXIS 2642, *2 (Apr. 1994); Bradford C.
Mank, The Two-Headed Dragon of Siting and Cleaning Up Hazardous Waste
Dumps: Can Economic Incentives or Mediation Slay the Monster?, 19 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 239, 248 n.60 (Fall/Winter 1991); Peter N. Lavalette, The
Security Interest Exemption Under CERCLA: Timely Relieffrom the EPA, 24 U.
TOL. L. REv. 473, 476 (Winter 1993).
7 Kelley v. Environmental Protection Agency, 15 F.3d 1100, 1109 (D.C.
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, American Bankers Assoc. v. Kelley, 115 S. Ct. 900
(1995).
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under CERCLA. A discussion of the EPA Final Rule regarding
lender liability and the subsequent decision by the D.C. Circuit
Court to vacate this rule will be included. Part III will address the
options for secured lenders faced with potential liability under
CERCLA, including the consequences and possible drawbacks for
each option.
H. Analysis of the Purposes of CERCLA
The Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA) was enacted in 1980 to address the
clean-up liability and prevention of hazardous waste contamination
such as that which occurred in Love Canal, a suburban
neighborhood near Niagara Falls, New York.8  Included in the
original CERCLA was a provision authorizing the creation of a
fund to be used to finance the Environmental Protection Agency's
remediation efforts (Superfund).9 As it became clear that the $1.6
billion authorized by Congress would not be nearly enough to clean
up the many thousands of hazardous waste sites around the country,
provisions were developed by which the Superfund could be
replenished."0 One such provision allowed the government to hold
those parties responsible for the contamination liable for the cost of
8 ToPOL, supra note 3, at §1.1. During the 1940's and 1950's, the Love
Canal was used by Hooker Chemicals and Plastics Corporation to dispose of
hundreds of 55-gallon drums containing hazardous chemical waste. The property
was then donated to the Niagara Falls Board of Education which, in turn,
constructed a school on the site. Single family homes were also built adjacent to
the canal. Discovery of the contamination led to the abandonment of the school
and the homes.
9 H.R.REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980), reprinted in
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6134.
10 Carol vanBergen, The Economic Implications of Increased Lender Liability
for Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 1 GEo. MASON U. L. REv. 93, 96 (1994).
CERCLA
the clean-up." Section 107(a) of CERCLA states that "the owner
and operator of ... a facility ... shall be liable for all costs of
removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State."1" This liability has been characterized by
the courts as being joint and several liability, meaning that any
responsible party may be made to pay the entire cost of the
clean-up.' 3
The impact intended by Congress in adopting this section has
been the subject of intense debate. Critics have complained of the
lack of legislative history regarding this section, and the ambiguity
of the language defining "owner and operator" has resulted in
several cases reaching opposing conclusions about the liability of a
secured lender.14 While lenders acting to protect a secured interest
are exempt from the definition of "owner/operator," the extent of
this exemption is unclear. Lenders may take precautions to protect
their secured interest; however, actions which are deemed by the
courts to be "participation in management" will render the
exemption inapplicable and may result in the lender being held
liable. The reluctance of the courts to decide on a clear standard
and their inability to define "participation in management" has only
added to the confusion about the degree of action a lender may take
without losing the secured creditor exemption.
11 42 U.S.C. §9607(a) (1994 & Supp. 1995).
12 Id.
13 United States v. Colorado & Eastern R.R. Co., No. 94-1041 and No. 93-
1422, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5562, at *11 (Mar. 17, 1995) ("It is well settled
that §107 imposes joint and several liability on PRPs regardless of fault"). See
also County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 993 F.2d 1508 (10th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 809-811 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
14 vanBergen, supra note 10, at 94.
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III. History of Lender Liability Under CERCLA
The initial decision in the area of lender liability under
CERCLA was rendered in United States v. Mirabile.15  In that
case, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
held that one way a secured lender could be held liable under
CERCLA is to have participated in the day-to-day operations at the
site. 16
One of the lenders in that case, Mellon Bank National
Association (Mellon), became involved when its predecessor in
interest, Girard Bank, advanced capital to the paint manufacturing
enterprise located on the contaminated property. This loan was
secured by the inventory and assets of the corporation. 7
The court found that Girard's actions presented an issue of fact
as to whether it participated in the management of the facility.
During the term of the loan, a Girard Bank loan officer was a
member of the Advisory Board, a group of executives who oversaw
the operation of the facility.18 After the corporation filed its
bankruptcy petition, Girard Bank became even more involved in
overseeing the finances of the corporation.9 Because the degree of
Mellon's participation in management presented an issue of fact, the
court denied its motion for summary judgment.20
Another lender in the case, American Bank & Trust (ABT),
became involved after foreclosing on property securing a loan in
15 No. Civ.A.84-2280, 1985 WL 97, 15 Envtl. L. Rep 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
6, 1985).
16 M. at *6.
17 Id. at *5.
18 Id.
19 Id. at *5, *8. Testimony revealed that Girard Bank demanded that
additional sales efforts be made and that the corporation accept Girard's
supervision if it wanted to continue to receive Girard funds. Id. at *8.
20 Id. at *9
CERCLA
default.21 It held title to the property for approximately four months
during which time it secured the property against vandalism,
inquired into the disposal of drums left on the property, and,
through its loan officer, visited the property for the purpose of
showing it to prospective purchasers. In December, 1981, ABT
assigned its interest to the Mirabiles. Subsequently, the Mirabiles
were named as defendants in a lawsuit to recover costs associated
with hazardous waste cleanup brought by the United States
Government under CERCLA. The Mirabiles joined ABT, among
others, as third party defendants.
In a summary judgment action brought by ABT, the court
found that ABT's actions in this matter were clearly for the purpose
of protecting its security interest in the property2 It stated that
congressional intent in enacting CERCLA was to impose liability on
"those who were responsible for and profited from improper
disposal practices."23 Because ABT made no effort to continue
operations and acted in a prudent and reasonable manner at all
times, the court thought it clear that liability should not be imposed
upon ABT.24 It declined to rule, however, on exactly which
activities would be permitted under CERCLA.1
The next year, a decision by the District Court for the district
of Maryland made foreclosure on property a hazardous venture for
lenders. In United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.,26 the
court held that the secured lender exemption applies only to those
parties who hold an indicia of ownership to protect a security
interest at the time of cleanup.
The property involved in that case is located in California,
21 Id. at *2.




26 632 F. Supp. 573 (D.Md. 1986).
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Maryland. During the 1970's, Maryland Bank & Trust (MBT)
loaned money to the owner of the property for two of his trash
removal businesses. Also during the 1970's, the owner of the
property permitted hazardous waste to be dumped on his property.27
In 1980, MBT issued a loan to M.W. McLeod to purchase the
property.28 Shortly thereafter, he defaulted on the loan and MBT
instituted a foreclosure action. On May 15, 1982, MBT took title
to the property and continued to be record owner of the property
until the time of the suit.
In 1983, EPA was informed by the Director of Environmental
Hygiene for St. Mary's County, Maryland of the existence of
hazardous wastes at the site. An EPA inspection confirmed the
presence of hazardous wastes and a removal action was instituted
and a cost recovery action brought against MBT under CERCLA.
MBT argued that it was exempt from liability because it
merely held an indicia of ownership to protect its security interest.
However, the court held that the secured lender exemption only
applies to those who hold an indicia of ownership to protect a
security interest at the time that cleanup begins.29 The court stated
that by taking title to the property at the foreclosure sale, MBT had
caused its security interest to ripen into full title. MBT was liable
for cleanup costs because it held full title at the time cleanup began.
According to the court, the secured lender exemption was
intended by Congress to protect those who were required at
common law to hold title while the mortgage is in force."
27 Id. at 575.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 579.
30 Id. Depending on the state in which it is located, there are two positions
a lender may take when financing property. Most states follow the "lien" theory
in which the lender does not hold actual title to the property but merely has the
right to foreclose and sell the property if the borrower defaults on the loan. By
comparison, about twelve states follow the "title" theory of mortgages in which
CERCLA
Congress did not, as MBT implicitly contended, intend to protect
a former mortgagee currently holding title after purchasing the
property at a foreclosure sale. The court disagreed with the holding
in Mirabile,31 but it stated that it would be possible to distinguish
the two cases.32 They can be distinguished based on the
"reasonableness" of the lenders' actions. Where the bank in
Mirabile only held the property for four months, MBT held title to
the property for almost four years.33 The court, however, did not
decide what would have been the holding had MBT attempted to
sell the property immediately after foreclosure.
Lender liability under CERCLA was even more broadly
defined in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., where the
Eleventh Circuit explicitly rejected the Mirabile standard and held
that a secured creditor may incur liability even without meeting the
definition of operator. 35 Day-to-day participation in the operations
at the facility was no longer required; Fleet Factors held that a
secured lender may incur liability "by participating in the financial
management of the facility to a degree indicating a capacity to
influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous wastes. "36 In
this case, the court found that Fleet Factor's activities could support
the inference that it could have affected the disposal of hazardous
the lender actually takes title to the property when issuing a loan. See also
vanBergen, supra note 9, at 98.
31 Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 580.
32 Id. at 579.
33 vanBergen, supra note 10, at 101-102.
34 901 F.2d 1550 (1lth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct 752 (1991).
35 Id. at 1557.
36 Id. While EPA characterized this language as dicta in their Lender Liability
Rule, most commentators have recognized it as a holding. See, e.g., James R.
Deason, Note, Clear as Mud: The Function of the National Contingency Plan in
a CERCLA Cost Recovery Action, 28 GA. L. REV. 555, 566 (1994); Frank S.
Alexander, Federal Intervention in Real Estate Finance: Preemption and Federal
Common Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 293, 319 n.144 (Jan. 1993).
1996]
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waste if it so chose. 7
In 1976, Fleet Factors entered into a "factoring"3
arrangement with Swainsboro Print Works (SPW) whereby Fleet
agreed to advance funds to SPW in exchange for assignment of
SPW's accounts receivable. As collateral, Fleet obtained a security
interest in SPW's facility and all of its equipment. This factoring
arrangement continued until 1981, when Fleet stopped advancing
funds to SPW because SPW's debts to Fleet had exceeded the value
of SPW's accounts receivable.3 9 Shortly thereafter, Fleet foreclosed
on its security interest, auctioned the collateral equipment and
contracted to have the premises cleaned." On January 20, 1984, the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") inspected the facility
and found 700 fifty-five gallon drums containing toxic chemicals
and forty-four truckloads of material containing asbestos. "40
During the time that the factoring arrangement existed between
Fleet and SPW, Fleet participated in many aspects of SPW's
business. It established prices and shipping schedules, al determined
employee layoffs,42 supervised the office administrator,43 received
and processed tax forms,' 4 controlled access to the facility,45 and
required SPW to seek its approval before shipping goods to
customers. 46 The court found these actions to constitute enough
37 Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1560.
38 Factoring is defined as a "sale of accounts receivable of a firm to a factor
at a discounted price. The purchase of accounts receivable from a business by a
factor who thereby assumes the risk of loss in return for some agreed discount."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 532 (5th ed. 1979).
39 Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1552.
40 Id. at 1553.







support for the inference that Fleet Factors could have influenced
SPW's hazardous waste disposal if it so chose. Because this
inference was supported, the court held that Fleet Factor's motion
for summary judgment on the issue of its exemption from liability
as a secured lender was properly denied.47
By holding secured lenders liable for merely being able to
affect the lender's disposal of hazardous waste, the court sought to
encourage lenders to fully investigate a potential debtor's waste
disposal system 48 and to require creditors to insist upon compliance
with acceptable standards "as a prerequisite to continued and future
financial support."49
Although the Fleet Factors decision did increase awareness in
the lender community of the need to protect oneself from possible
CERCLA liability, it also contributed to the lenders' desire to
distance themselves from any aspect of a borrower's business.50
The possibility of being held liable under CERCLA merely for the
ability to influence disposal of hazardous waste led lenders to
question which, if any, activities would be permitted.
A. The EPA Final Rule on Lender Liability
By defining unclear phrases in CERCLA and defining and
specifying a range of activities that may be taken by a secured
lender without losing the exemption granted by section 101(20)(A),
EPA sought to limit CERCLA liability for secured lenders.5" The
EPA's Final Rule on Lender Liability first sought to define three
key phrases that are otherwise not defined in CERCLA. The first
47 Id. at 1560.
48 Id. at 1558.
49 Id.
50 Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1104.
51 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Lender
Liability Under CERCLA, 40 C.F.R. §300.1100 (1994).
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of these phrases was "indicia of ownership."52
For the purpose of section 101(20)(A), the rule stated that
indicia of ownership meant simply "evidence of interests in real or
personal property. " 3 The EPA did not seek to limit the type
ownership indicia that may be held under the exception.1
4
However, the rule stated that the indicia of ownership must be held
primarily as protection for a security interest.'5
The second phrase defined in the final rule was "primarily to
protect a security interest."I6 To bring an ownership interest within
the exception, the interest had to be "maintained primarily for...
securing payment or performance of a loan.., and not an interest
in property held for some other reason. '57 The rule did not allow
those who held an ownership interest in property primarily to
protect an investment interest to take advantage of the secured
lender exemption .5 For example, many lending institutions will
hold an interest in property to protect an investment in a
corporation. Under the final rule, this type of secured interest
would not be protected by the secured lender exemption. However,
a lending institution that had a revenue interest in a loan that created
a security interest would be considered a secured creditor and
52 Id. at 92.
53 Id.
54 Id. Evidence of ownership interests include, but are not limited to,
"mortgages, deeds of trust, liens, surety bonds and guarantees of obligations, title
held pursuant to a lease financing transaction in which the lessor does not initially
select the leased property, . . . [or] legal or equitable title obtained pursuant to
foreclosure, and their equivalents."
55 Id. at 93.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. In Maryland Bank & Trust Co., the court stated that the bank was
holding an ownership interest in the property to protect its investment interest.
Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F.Supp. at 579.
CERCLA
therefore would be exempt from liability under CERCLA.5 9
The third phrase defined in EPA's final rule was
"[p]articipation in the management of a facility . . . "6 In this
definition, EPA sought to limit the broad definition set forth in
Fleet Factors by stating that actual participation in the management
or operation of the facility was necessary to hold a person liable as
an owner/operator. 61 The capacity or unexercised right to influence
was no longer to be considered participation in the management of
the facility. Although EPA included a list of permissible lender
activities in the rule, 62 it conceded that not all possible situations
could be foreseen. As a guideline for determining if an activity
would cause a lender to lose the secured lender exemption, EPA
outlined a general test of participation in management.63
Under the general test outlined in the EPA final rule, a lender
holding a secured interest would not be considered to be
participating in management unless, while the borrower was still in
possession, the lender either:
(1) exercises decisionmaking control over the
borrower's environmental compliance, such that
the [lender] had undertaken responsibility for
the borrower's waste disposal or hazardous
substance handling practices;
or
(2) exercises control at a level comparable to that of
a manager of the borrower's enterprise, such
59 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Lender
Liability Under CERCLA, 40 C.F.R. §300.1100 (1994).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 94.
63 Id. at 93.
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that the [lender] has assumed or manifested
responsibility for the overall management of the
enterprise encompassing the day to day
decisionmaking of the enterprise with respect to:
(A) Environmental compliance; or
(B) All, or substantially all, of the operational (as
opposed to financial or administrative) aspects
of the enterprise other than environmental
compliance.' 4
The purpose of this general test was to provide a basic
framework within which a lender's actions could be assessed.
Under the first prong of the test, a lender would be outside of the
exemption if it actually participated in decisions affecting the
borrower's environmental compliance. 65 This prong allowed those
who merely had the ability to influence but did not exercise it to
receive the protection of the secured lender exemption.
The second prong of the test was an attempt to exclude from
the exemption those lenders who controlled many aspects of the
borrower's business but did not assume responsibility for
environmental compliance. 66 Under the second prong, these
actions by a lender will void the secured lender exemption because
the ability to carve out environmental compliance responsibilities
demonstrates that the lender "has manifested or assumed operational
responsibility at a management level that includes such matters, and
doing so is considered to be participation in the facility's
management. "67
64 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Lender
Liability Under CERCLA, 40 C.F.R. §300.1100 (1994).
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Lender
Liability Under CERCLA 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
CERCLA
The general test was to be used in assessing common lender
actions not specifically addressed by the rule. If the lender's
activities were consistent with the test, the lender would be covered
by the secured lender exemption. The rule also provided that a
lender would be covered by the exemption if its actions were
included in a specific list of permissible actions.
Permissible activities included in the rule were divided into
those acts by the lender at the inception of the loan,6" those acts
taking place during the term of the loan (the policing of the loan),69
and those acts after the foreclosure on the property securing the
loan.70 The listed activities in the rule were based on court
decisions regarding the scope of the exemption and on input from
commentators. Although courts had attempted to draw a rough line
between those actions that were and were not permitted, the purpose
of the EPA rule was to "define with greater precision the point at
which a holder's actions pass from oversight and advice to actually
facility management." 71 The rule stated that prior to the loan
inception, the lender was not considered to have a secured interest
in the property absent evidence to the contrary. With respect to the
general test of participation in management, a lender's actions
before the transaction were irrelevant.72 Therefore, a lender could
give specific or general advice or suggestions without fear that these
actions would be used for determination of participation in
management. Additionally, the rule allowed a lender to request or
even undertake an environmental inspection of the property prior to
§300.1100).
68 40 C.F.R. §300.1100 (1994).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 95.
71 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Lender
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the inception of the loan without affecting its status under the
secured lender exemption.73
If an inspection revealed contamination but the contamination
was minimal or the chance of default was slight, a lender might
choose to continue with the transaction. The rule allowed a lender
in this situation to maintain its status as an exempt secured lender
even though it required the borrower to clean up the site during the
term of the loan;74 required assurance of the borrower's compliance
with applicable federal, state and local environmental rules;75
and/or secured permission to periodically inspect the facility.76 The
rule, however, stated that these types of actions by a lender would
not result in the lender becoming the insurer of environmental
safety at the facility. Lender liability under the rule could not be
based upon the inclusion of environmental warranties in the loan
contract.77
During the term of the loan, the lender may determine that
action needs to be taken to safeguard the secured interest from loss.
This determination is usually made when default is imminent or has
already occurred. These actions, commonly referred to as loan
"work out" activities, 78 are undertaken to prevent, mitigate or cure
a default by the borrower and to prevent the loss of value of the
security. 79 These activities are considered common lender activities
and, so long as they were consistent with the general test of
participation in management, the rule stated that the lender would






79 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Lender
Liability Under CERCLA 57 Fed.Reg. 18,344 (1992) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
§300.1100).
CERCLA
not be taken out of the secured lender exemption."°
To avoid liability after foreclosure, the EPA rule required that
the lender continue to act primarily to protect its security interest.81
Acting to protect a security interest means that the lender must
attempt to prevent as much of the loss as is reasonable. Not acting
to prevent loss would void the exemption. The exemption would be
voided if, for example, the lender did not seek to sell the property
within a reasonable amount of time.' The rule offered a bright line
mechanism through which a lender could retain the secured lender
exemption. To be eligible to use this mechanism, the lender was
required to list the property with a broker or otherwise advertise it
on a monthly basis within twelve months of taking title.8 3
Additionally, the lender was forbidden to reject or outbid any other
fair offer. 4 Doing so would result in violation of the bright line
mechanism and possibly a finding that the secured lender exemption
had been voided.
The EPA's Final Rule on Lender Liability was an attempt to
determine what level of involvement is sufficient to void the
CERCLA secured lender exemption. However, a 1994 D.C. Circuit
Court decision held that the EPA had overstepped its boundaries in
making this determination.
80 Id.
81 40 C.F.R. §300.1100 (1994).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. Fair offer is defined as the value of the security interest. The value of
the security interest is calculated as an amount equal to or greater than the sum
of the outstanding principal, plus any unpaid interest, rent or penalties, plus all
reasonable and necessary costs or fees, plus response costs incurred under
CERCLA section 107(d)(1), less any amounts already received by the lender in
connection with the property.
1996] 147
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B. Judicial Treatment of Lender Liability after the Final Rule
In Kelley v.'Environmental Protection Agency,' the court
vacated the final rule defining the scope of lender liability under
CERCLA.86 The court stated that the EPA had no authority to
promulgate a substantive rule on lender liability 87 and furthermore,
the rule should not be given deference as an interpretive rule.8"
Agency authority to promulgate substantive rules must be
expressly or implicitly intended by Congress.8 9 EPA attempted to
show evidence of congressional intent to allow it define section 107
liability first through the broad language of section 105.o Section
105 authorizes EPA "to reflect and effectuate the responsibilities
and powers created by this chapter." 91 EPA argued that defining
liability under section 107 should be characterized as a
"responsibility and power. "92 The court rejected that argument,
however, as not a specific delegation of authority to interpret
section 107. 91
Another EPA argument was that section 106 implicitly granted
it authority to define liability. 94 Under that section, a party ordered
by EPA to clean up a site may petition EPA for reimbursement of
its costs.95 A refusal by EPA to reimburse the party may result in
85 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied.
86 Id. at 1109.
87 Id. at 1108.
88 Id. at 1108.
89 Id. at 1105.
90 Id.
91 Id.; 42 U.S.C. §9605 (1994).
92 Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1105.
93 Id.at 1105,1106. The court stated that section 105 "refers to the nature of
actions parties must take in response to contamination- not their ultimate liability
.." Id. at 1106.
94 Id.; 42 U.S.C. §9606 (1994).
95 Id.
CERCLA
a federal court ordering reimbursement if it determines that the
party was not liable or that the EPA order was arbitrary, capricious
or illegal. EPA argued that it determines liability issues when it
determines whether or not to grant the petition for reimbursement.
The court reached another conclusion. Under the court's
reading of section 106 of CERCLA, in a reimbursement proceeding
EPA acts merely as would a defendant in a civil lawsuit.9 6 In
deciding whether to grant reimbursement, EPA is in effect deciding
whether to settle a suit. Just as in a civil lawsuit, the defendant's
reasons for not settling should not be considered by the court in
deciding liability issues. 7 Additionally, questions of liability under
section 107 can be brought to court without any government
involvement. Under these circumstances, EPA could quite possibly
become involved in a case as a plaintiff seeking to recover its costs.
According to the court, "it cannot be argued that Congress intended
EPA, one of many potential plaintiffs, to have authority to, by
regulation, define liability for a class of potential defendants."98
Because there is no clear congressional intent to grant EPA
authority to define liability under section 107 of CERCLA, the
court held that EPA's final rule could not be considered as a
substantive rule of law.99 The court next considered the assertion
by EPA that the rule should be given deference as an interpretive
rule.
According to the court, EPA may only bring questions of
liability to federal court as a prosecutor. 10° Congress did not give
EPA authority to determine the interpretation of liability under
CERCLA.01  Where this authority has not been given, judicial
96 See Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1107.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 1109.
100 Id. at 1108.
101 Id.
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deference to an agency's interpretation is "inappropriate."
1 2
The Kelley decision to vacate the EPA final rule once again
left the lending industry with no clear standard by which to
determine what actions will result in CERCLA liability. In essence,
the D.C. Circuit Court's vacating of the EPA's final rule brought
back the participation in management standard as outlined in Fleet
Factors. However, criticism of the broad reach of Fleet Factors led
two courts to decline to follow its standard.
In In Re Bergsoe Metal Corp., °3 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that there must be some actual participation in
management by the creditor before it will lose the secured lender
exemption."° However, the court declined to decide which actions
will cause a lender to fall outside the exemption, stating that there
was no need to decide that issue because the lender involved in
Bergsoe did not participate in the management of the facility
whatsoever. 10
In this case, Bergsoe Metal Corporation entered an agreement
with the Port of St. Helens to build a lead recycling facility. The
agreement consisted essentially of a sale-and-lease-back
arrangement between Bergsoe and the Port, which in turn
mortgaged its interest to the United States National Bank of Oregon.
Bergsoe was required to make its lease payments directly to the
bank, and the lease expired when the money owed on the
sale-and-lease-back arrangement was paid in full.
Bergsoe, through its shareholders, EAC, argued that the Port
was liable for any cleanup costs under CERCLA because its actions
during the term of the loan constituted participation in management.
The court, however, disagreed with EAC's argument. It stated that
102 Id.
103 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
104 Id. at 672.
105 Id.
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regardless of the rights the Port may have had," 6 "it cannot have
participated in management if it never exercised them."1°7
In another case, Z & Z Leasing, Inc. v. Graying Reel, Inc. ,"
the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern
Division, refused to adopt the "narrow" Fleet Factors test.109 The
court stated that to do so would "largely eviscerate the exemption
Congress intended to afford secured creditors." 110 However, this
decision did not alleviate any of the confusion surrounding lender
liability. Although the court refused to adopt the Fleet Factors test,
it also refused to outline a specific standard through which liability
could attach.111
According to the court, secured lenders must routinely have
some involvement in their borrower's financial affairs in order to
protect their interests.112 In this case, the court stated that the
Bank's actions were "prudent and routine steps to protect its
security interest only. "113 The court, therefore, refused to punish
the bank for requiring a borrower to obey the law.
1 14
106 Id. at 672-673. The lease granted the Port certain rights, among them the
right to inspect the premises and to reenter and take possession upon foreclosure.
The court found these rights to be reasonable rights retained by almost all secured
lenders.
107 Id. at 673.
108 873 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
109 Id. at 55.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 55.
113 Id. at 55. The bank's actions in this case consisted of imposing certain
negative covenants upon the borrower. The borrower was required to obtain
written permission from the bank prior to amending operative documents;
merging or selling assets; incurring indebtedness; agreeing to guarantee
obligations; purchasing assets or stock; creating or incurring liens; making loans;
purchasing or leasing fixed assets; or purchasing, redeeming or acquiring its
capital stock.
114 Id. at 55-56.
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By refusing to adopt the strict Fleet Factors standard, the
courts in Bergsoe and Z & Z Leasing gave lenders some reason to
believe that routine lender actions will not lead to liability under
CERCLA. However, the possibility remains that courts in the
future will strictly follow Fleet Factors. 15 Lenders, therefore, must
take steps to reduce the risk of CERCLA liability.
IV. Options for Secured Lenders faced with Potential Liability
The traditional means by which a lender would avoid risk was
to avoid the risky property altogether. However, with regard to
CERCLA liability, this approach is unrealistic. 116  Almost all
environmental assessments of commercial property reveal some
form of potential environmental risk."7 From a lender's
perspective, this means that any loan secured by commercial
property is a risk. However, because commercial lending is a
major function of most large banks, complete withdrawal from
commercial lending would deprive most lending institutions of a
primary source of revenue." 8 Withdrawal from the commercial
lending arena, therefore, is not an option. This does not mean,
however, that lending institutions should choose the other extreme
by ignoring the possibility of CERCLA liability and continuing
their traditional lending practices. Although no method of avoiding
115 vanBergen, supra note 10, at 106.
116 Laura E. Peck, Note, Viable Protection Mechanisms for Lenders Against
Hazardous Waste Liability, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 106 (1989).
117 Jeffrey C. Fort et al., Due Diligence for Environmental Issues in
Transactions, in Attorney's Guide to Environmental Liability in Transactions,
1-1, 1-9 (Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education ed., 1991). "It cannot
be overemphasized that each and every property may conceal hidden
environmental risks."
118 Peck, supra note 116, at 105.
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CERCLA liability is completely safe, some common sense and a
combination of certain actions will serve to prevent lender liability
under CERCLA in most cases.
A. Environmental Audits
Before the inception of the loan, requiring an independent
environmental assessment of the property may help a lender to
identify possible environmental hazards." 9 An environmental audit
will not protect a lender from liability should it enter the
transaction; however, an audit may give the lender an idea of the
extent of the contamination and the amount of money that may be
needed to clean up the site. 20 This information could be used in
assigning a risk factor to the loan and also in determining the
amount of liability insurance that may be required.
1. Assessment of the Property
Environmental auditing before the inception of the loan serves
the purpose of informing the lender of the possibility of
environmental problems."'2 However, there are some drawbacks to
the audit procedure. The first drawback is the cost of the audit
itself. 12
2
To be effective, an environmental audit must be performed by
119 Id. at 107. See also Patricia A. Shackelford, Easing the Credit Crunch: A
"Functional" Approach to Lender Control Liability under CERCLA, 19 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 805, 847 (Summer 1992) (many lenders now require
environmental audits as a precondition to financing).
120 Peck, supra note 116, at 107.
121 Id.
122 T.J. Becker, Clean-up Costs, Red Tape tie up Recycling Sites, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan 15, 1995, Real Estate Section, at 1. A simple environmental audit can cost
from $1,000 to $10,000. More detailed examinations can reach $70,000.
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an independent auditing team of adequate size and training.1
23
Additionally, the auditing team must be provided with accurate,
detailed information of past, present and future uses for the site. 1
24
Because there is a general lack of expertise in the lending industry
regarding environmental compliance, l21 an accurate environmental
audit requires that outside experts be consulted. Although the cost
of retaining these experts and conducting the pre-loan audits will
eventually be passed on to borrowers in the form of higher loan
fees,126 the possibility of fewer loan applications because of the
higher costs may require the lender to bear some of the burden of
its borrowers' environmental compliance.
Another drawback associated with environmental auditing is
that each audit is merely an analysis of one moment in time. 1 As
a company's activities and the legal requirements which apply to
those activities change, the procedures recommended by an audit
may become obsolete. 128 While on one hand the purpose of an audit
is to predict the future of environmental compliance procedures, a
prediction cannot be used as a true-risk minimizing factor.
129
Therefore, to effectively minimize risk, environmental auditing
must be incorporated into a program of assessing environmental
compliance throughout the term of the loan. 13 0
123 Peck, supra note 116, at 108.
124 Id. at 109.
125 vanBergen, supra note 10, at 10.
126 Id.
127 Peck, supra note 116, at 113.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 114. See also Valerie A. Zondorak, A New Face in Corporate
Environmental Responsibility: The Valdez Principles, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 457, 491 n. 185 (Spring, 1991) (A comprehensive environmental audit would
entail "using checklists and questionnaires to evaluate compliance... ; reviewing
worker's compensation 'loss runs' to evaluate pollution and health problems;
making periodic visits to facilities to review compliance efforts; ... evaluating
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Continued assessment of the facility and the regulations
affecting the facility may, however, possibly increase a lender's
chance of liability. Requiring periodic environmental audits after
the inception of the loan may be viewed as "participation in
management" under a strict application of the Fleet Factors
standard."' Although Fleet Factors has been roundly criticized,132
it has not been overruled. As a result, there is no guarantee that its
standard for participation in management will not be used to hold
a lender liable for requiring continued environmental assessment of
a borrower's facility.
2. Assessment of the Law
Another type of environmental audit that may be used by
lenders to minimize risk is an assessment of all environmental laws
and regulations applicable to a certain transaction.133 The lender
could develop a risk assessment checklist or matrix"M through which
compliance with environmental regulations could be evaluated.
the history of all real estate owned by the corporation... and performing a site
inspection. ").
131 Peck, supra note 116, at 114.
132 See, e.g., Geoffrey K. Beach, Note, Secured Creditor Lender Liability
After United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.: Vindication of CERCL4 's Private
Enforcement Action, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 211, 217 (1991); Fleet Factors
Creates Dilemma for Lenders, ABA Conferees Told, 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No.
3, at 113 (June 20, 1990); Michael I. Greenberg & David M. Shaw, Note, To
Lend or Not To Lend- That Should be the Question: The Uncertainties of Lender
Liability Under CERCLA, 1991 Duke L.J. 1211, 1212 (1991).
133 Peck, supra note 116, at 110.
134 Id. at 110 n.120. An example of a matrix would be "[o]ne hundred possible
activities ... listed in the matrix along one axis, with 88 possible impacts listed
along the other axis. Thus, 8,800 interactions can be displayed or indicated by
means of this matrix." (quoting J. HEER & D.J. HAGERTY, ENvIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENTS and STATEMENTS 159 (1977)).
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This type of system may be favorable to lenders because it does not
require activities which may be viewed as participation in
management of the facility and furthermore, it evaluates the legal
requirements for the borrower and will identify noncompliance.13
A lender may also prefer to use this type of system to develop a
response to a borrower's default on possibly contaminated property.
By analyzing past case law and the language of current regulations,
a lender may be able to predict what actions it may take without
incurring CERCLA liability.'36 For example, a lender would
probably avoid liability as an owner/operator under CERCLA if it
could show that it did not foreclose on the property and that the
actions it took were typical of a reasonable, prudent lender. 137 This
approach is in no way guaranteed; however, there is a strong
likelihood that reasonable, prudent actions by a lender to protect its
secured interest will not result in CERCLA liability.
There are certain drawbacks to environmental law assessment
as a strategy to minimize CERCLA liability. First, the cost
involved may be quite high. 138 Accurate environmental law
assessment requires expertise in environmental law. As was the
case with environmental compliance assessment, this type of
expertise is not common in the lending industry. 139 Therefore,
outside environmental law experts would need to be consulted.
Because the scope of liability under CERCLA is constantly
changing,1" this consultation would have to be ongoing, resulting
in ongoing costs and higher loan fees.
135 Peck, supra note 116, at 111.
136 Zondorak, supra note 130, at 470.
137 See Z & Z Leasing, Inc. v. Graying Reel, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 51, 55 (E.D.
Mich. 1995); In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d at 672.
138 vanBergen, supra note 10, at 110.
139 Id.
140 Stanley M. Spracker & James D. Barnett, Lender Liability under CERCLA,
1990 COLuM. BUS. L. REv. 527, 551.
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Second, courts have not addressed every possible action that
may be taken by a secured lender with regard to possibly
contaminated property. Therefore, it is likely that the lender will
face the need to act in a way not previously sanctioned in case law.
In those situations, the lender would need to rely on its own
common sense assessment of what constitutes reasonable lender
activity.
Third, conclusions and predictions regarding lender liability
under CERCLA are limited to the jurisdiction on which they are
based. An eleventh circuit decision such as Fleet Factors may or
may not be followed in a different forum.14' If a lender conducts
business in many jurisdictions, the amount of data and upkeep
necessary to make an informed decision about the best forum in
which to defend a lawsuit may be astronomical.
Although there are drawbacks to all types of environmental
audits, lending institutions continue to rely on them to provide
insight into the possibility of liability under CERCLA. 42 This
insight, coupled with another option such as environmental
insurance, may work to decrease the cost to the lender in the event
of a default on contaminated property.
B. Environmental Liability Insurance
The use of liability insurance is another step a lender may take
to protect itself against losses stemming from hazardous waste
cleanup.' 43 Policies such as those offered by the Colorado firm
141 John W. Ames et al., Toxins-Are-Us: Superfund Reform and Lender
Liability in Congress--Dredging the Safe Harbor in the Wake of Kelley, 1994
A.B.I. Jnl., available in LEXIS 2695, *5 (June 1994).
142 John W. Milligan, It's Not Easy Being Green, U.S. BANKER, Dec. 1994,
at 40.
143 Peck, supra note 116, at 115.
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ERIC Group, Inc.'" provide protection for both borrowers and
lenders against hazardous waste cleanup costs. These policies
provide the procedures for pre-loan environmental audits as well as
the engineers needed to perform the audits. 4 ' The policy then
protects the lender from the costs associated with cleaning up
pollution not detected by the environmental audit. 146
The costs for these policies range from $5,000 to $10,000 per
$1 million of insured value;"'47 however, these costs are
substantially less than the potential cost of a CERCLA cleanup.
Additionally, a lender may find that these costs may be passed on
to the borrower in some cases. For instance, a borrower involved
in a multi-million dollar loan transaction would be unlikely to risk
rejection of the loan based on the addition of $10,000 to $20,000 in
insurance costs.148 Although liability insurance may prevent a
lender's losses in some situations, it is not practical in every case. 149
The high cost of such insurance is prohibitive in loan
transactions involving less valuable property. 50 To spend $10,000
to insure a $100,000 loan may seem unthinkable to most lenders.
However, a lender may want to consider this insurance even in a
transaction involving less valuable property if the transaction
involves a high risk of potential contamination. 5' An outlay of
$10,000 by the lender may reduce its profits if thete is no
contamination, but it may also protect the future of its business if
144 vanflergen, supra note 10, at 112.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id., (quoting Insurance Offered for Superfund Liabilities, U.P.l., May 31,
1991 and June 1, 1991).
148 vanBergen, supra note 10, at 113.
149 Peck, supra note 116, at 121-122.
150 vanBergen, supra note 10, at 113.
151 Id.
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contamination is discovered. 152
V. Conclusion
Congressional inability to clearly define terms and judicial
unwillingness to set a bright line standard regarding lender liability
under CERCLA has created a need for those in the lending industry
to exercise a little common sense. 15 With the exception of Fleet
Factors, courts have been reluctant to hold lenders liable for the
acts of borrowers.154 Moreover, Fleet's actions in its agreement
with SPW clearly went beyond the scope of reasonable lender
actions; no doubt Fleet would have been liable as an operator for its
actions under any standard. 55 Notwithstanding Fleet Factors, it is
unlikely that a secured lender will be held liable under CERCLA if
its actions were those of a reasonable, prudent lender. 156
There is no question that lenders should fully investigate
property to be held as security in a loan agreement. If there is any
question of past contamination, the lender should either reject the
loan application outright or require an environmental audit prior to
152 Id.
153 Robert P. Simons, The Consequences of the Overturning of the EPA Lender
Liability Rule, 76 J. COM. LENDING 43 (Apr. 1994).
154 While the court in Maryland Bank & Trust held the bank liable for the cost
of the clean up, it did so based on the fact that MBT's interest had ripened into
full title at the time of the clean up, not based on MBT's status as a secured
lender. 632 F. Supp. at 579.
155 Simons, supra note 153, at 44.
156 See Randall J. Burke, Much Ado About Lending: Continuing Vitality of the
Fleet Factors Decision, 80 GEO. L.J. 809, 828 (Feb. 1992). While "reasonable
and prudent" may not be a bright line standard, some uncertainty in the lending
industry may be desirable "if it results in lenders exercising increased caution in
issuing loans and demanding assurances of insurance coverage and environmental
compliance verification."
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entering the transaction. 5 7 Although an environmental audit will
not preclude liability, it will give the lender an idea of the extent of
the contamination. Additionally, it will give the lender an idea of
the amount of insurance that will be required to adequately protect
it from possible loss.
If the lender has already entered the loan agreement, it should
remove itself as much as possible from the borrower's business.
Some advice or suggestions may be given by the lender, but all
decisions regarding the operation of the enterprise should be made
by the borrower.
If the borrower has defaulted or is likely to default on possibly
contaminated property, Maryland Bank & Trust has taught us that
to purchase after foreclosure is a dangerous proposition. A lender
may do so in order to protect its security interest, but it is
dangerously close to crossing the line between being a secured
lender with an exemption and a current operator with a liability.
The lender's best option in these circumstances is to request that the
borrower perform an environmental audit and agree to loan
additional funds to assist in the clean up if feasible. If the borrower
would be in no position to continue the business after a clean up, or
the environmental audit reveals that the damage is so widespread
that clean up would be too costly, the lender may save itself future
problems by writing the debt off and moving on to less risky
ventures.
Until such time as Congress specifically delegates authority to
EPA to define liability as it sees fit, or Congress itself defines what
lender liability will be, lenders must act cautiously, prudently, and
with common sense in making loans and in foreclosing on property
securing a loan.
157 Shackelford, supra note 119, at 847.
